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Review of Antony Lentin, Mr Justice McCardie (1869-1933): Rebel, Reformer, and Rogue Judge 
(Cambridge Scholars 2016) 
--- 
In this biography of Mr Justice McCardie, who sat as a High Court judge from 1916 until his death in 
1933, Lentin tells the story of a man who was always sure that he was right. Sometimes this drew 
admiration from those around him, and sometimes it did not. And despite the hidden, private life 
which came to light after his death, McCardie the public figure seems to have been unable to avoid 
the temptation to make his views – particularly his views on the proper role of a judge – as public as 
possible. All this is neatly encapsulated in the following remarkable series of events, which make up 
the bulk of chapter five. 
In January 1932, McCardie presided over the trial of Place v Searle at the Cambridgeshire assizes. Mr 
Place had sought damages from Dr Searle, who, he alleged, had ‘enticed’ his wife away from him. 
McCardie advised his jury that ‘a woman can leave her husband by her own free will … a woman’s 
body does not belong to the husband. It is her property: it is not his’ (107). When the jury failed to 
reach a verdict, he ruled that there had after all been no case to answer, and dismissed the action. Mr 
Place appealed, and before he had heard the case one of the appellate judges – Lord Justice Scrutton 
– allegedly threatened ‘to “give” it to [McCardie] to the full on the hearing of the appeal’ (125). In 
reversing McCardie’s judgment, Scrutton suggested that McCardie, as a bachelor, should not have 
been asked to pronounce on marital relations. McCardie was incensed, and repeatedly wrote to the 
Master of the Rolls – the judge responsible for the civil justice system – demanding either that Scrutton 
should issue a public apology or that he should be prohibited from hearing appeals against McCardie’s 
rulings. When his demands were not met, McCardie publicly announced, before a trial in the High 
Court, that ‘[i]f there be an appeal I shall not supply any copy of my notes until I am satisfied that Lord 
Justice Scrutton will not be a member of the court’ (126). This was an extraordinary statement which, 
while it did not directly go against any legal rule, was nonetheless an extremely provocative break 
with tradition, calculated to make appeals against McCardie’s rulings all but impossible. After an 
inevitable uproar in the press, and after a stern cup of tea with the Master of the Rolls, McCardie was 
eventually persuaded to withdraw his threat. 
In Place v Searle, McCardie is revealed as a judge who wanted to see progress in the law: throughout 
this biography, Lentin repeatedly points to instances of McCardie expressing his approval of female 
jurors, of criticising the restrictive nature of divorce laws, and of calling for reforms to the law on 
abortion as well as encouraging greater awareness of contraception. We can also see in this case how 
the ways McCardie conceived of his role as a judge brought him into conflict with those around him, 
as well as binging him to the attention of the press (whether for good or for bad). 
Throughout the book, there are hints at the ways in which McCardie’s seemingly idiosyncratic views 
on the role of a judge may have been less a product of his genius and more a product of his wide 
reading. We are told, for example, that he was keen to integrate a ‘sociological’ approach into his 
judicial work – indeed, this is one of the things Scrutton mocked in Place v Searle – and that he was an 
admirer of his American contemporary Roscoe Pound, a jurist who, as Dean of Harvard Law School 
between 1916 and 1936, repeatedly called for the establishment of a ‘sociological jurisprudence’. This 
fact makes McCardie an important part of the transatlantic story of American legal realism, a story 
which is often told in a way which prioritises jurists over judges. 
Those views of McCardie’s which are liable to cast the ‘rebel, reformer, and rogue judge’ in a negative 
light, notably his lifelong support for eugenics, are generally presented in this book as an unfortunate 
consequence of his time; but Lentin might usefully have pushed his analysis of these issues a little 
further. Given that McCardie was an avid follower of Roscoe Pound, is it possible that he was also an 
admirer of the American legal realists’ chief inspiration, the US Supreme Court justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr? Holmes, after all, had refused in 1927 to declare that a programme of compulsory 
sterilisation was an unconstitutional denial of liberty without due process of law. McCardie, in his 
passionate defence of eugenics, clearly shared more than a mere theory of the judicial role with figures 
such as Holmes. And if McCardie was indeed influenced by Holmes and those American jurists who 
took inspiration from him, what might this tell us more generally about the intellectual climate in 
which he operated? 
In their recent call for scholars to take what they call ‘legal life writing’ seriously, Mulcahy and 
Sugarman have argued that good legal biographies should allow us to reconsider the various 
relationships between law, society and history. By tracing through this story of Justice McCardie’s legal 
life, emphasising the ways in which his view of the judicial role differed from the models accepted and 
adopted by many of his peers, Lentin has certainly passed this test. This book will be of interest to 
anyone working on practices of adjudication in the early twentieth century; although it is hardly an 
account of a standard, average judge. Anyone who shares McCardie’s realist sympathies will, perhaps, 
doubt whether such a creature can ever really exist. 
 
